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This paper investigates the merits of different democratic institutions when politics is uni-
dimensional, there is uncertainty both about the preferences of the future electorate and the 
future polarization of political parties, and politicians have better information about the state 
of the world than voters. Three types of institutions are compared: direct democracy, 
representative democracy, where politicians are accountable and independent agencies, where 
they are not. Low uncertainty about the state of the world and the future electorate’s 
preferences and high expected polarization make direct democracy optimal, while the 
opposite configuration makes representative democracy optimal. Independent agencies are 
optimal for intermediate values. 
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The proper degree of governmental accountability has been the subject of a
l a r g ed e b a t ei nr e c e n ty e a r s .A l o n gw i t ht h ed e b a t em a n yi m p o r t a n tp o l i c y
decisions have been removed from the realm of representative democracy:
congresses and parliaments. Direct democracy, which has a long history in
Switzerland and several US states, has been used recently by several Eu-
ropean countries in the process of ratifying the treaties which govern the
development of the European Union. In contrast, important policy areas like
monetary policy have deliberately been moved from the control of congresses
and parliaments into central banks with high autonomy. Witness for instance
the creation of the European Central Bank. A similar process has taken place
in many other policy areas. Independent agencies take care of regulation of
telecoms etc. Alongside with these developments, the possibility of voting
through the internet has spurred interest in direct democracy.
Evidently politics concerns many diﬀerent issues, but as a ﬁrst approx-
imation we will consider the case where the grand issue, the salient issue
is uni-dimensional, and where the important divide among voters and par-
ties is inbetween left and right. Think of the salient issue as redistribution
policies, taxation or more generally the size of the welfare state. The paper
provides a ﬁrst takeon the relative advantages and drawbacks from the dif-
ferent governance structures: direct democracy, representative democracy or
independent agency.
The analysis focuses on the fundamental trade-oﬀ between information
and accountability. As Downs (1957) pointed out, the electorate at large
has insuﬃcient incentives to become informed about complicated issues in
politics, the functioning of the economy etc. Politicians on the other hand are
1briefed by experts and bureaucrats and it is their job to gather information
and take decisions. In short there is an asymmetry of information between
the electorate and the politicians. This asymmetry of information speaks in
favor of delegating decision making from the electorate to elected politicians.
Delegation, however, raises problems of congruence of preferences and of
accountability. When voters elect representatives to take political decisions,
it is important for them that the politicians have preferences similar to their
own. We consider a society with two parties motivated by ideology and
power. When parties’ ideologies are polarized, voters are faced with a non-
trivial choice between left and right. Then the problem of congurence of
preferences becomes important. Polarization also inﬂuences the implications
of accountability, as a left wing government will take over if a right wing
government is voted out of oﬃce.
The choice of governance structure is a long run decision, written in
the constitution. When it is decided, the future is uncertain: The future
polarization of parties is unknown, as are the preferences of future electorates.
Similarly, the economic conditions and other basic state variables - the state
of nature - can not be forecasted with certainty. This multi-dimensional
uncertainty is an important feature inﬂuencing the constitutional choice.
The paper provides a model where a constitutional stage is followed by
two policy periods in which policy is determined through the governance
structure chosen at the constitutional stage. At the constitutional stage the
degree of polarization of the parties, the exact preferences of future median
voters and the future state of nature are all stochastic variables, unknown to
the voters, who only know the distributions. After the choice of constitution,
voters learn how polarized the parties are. When they cast votes - either on
policies as in direct democracy or on parties as in representative democracy,
2they are however still uninformed about the state of nature unlike the politi-
cians as discussed by Downs. We calculate expected utilities for all voters
for each of the three modes of governance. As it turns out the ranking of all
voters are the same in the model, so it makes sense to speak of a best mode
of governance.
Direct democracy has the advantage that the preferences governing the
choice of policy is the electorate’s, or more precisely the median voter’s. The
more polarized are the parties the larger is this advantage. For suﬃciently
high degrees of polarization, direct democracy is the best governance struc-
ture for voters. The drawback of direct democracy is that the policy choice
is uninformed and that future policies are uncertain if the preferences of the
electorate are very uncertain. The more uncertainty about the state of the
world and the electorate’s preferences, the less attractive is therefore direct
democracy. For higher degrees of uncertainty and lower degrees of polariza-
tion, the crucial choice is between representative democracy and independent
agencies. Both governance structures ensure that the actual choice of the pol-
icy is made by an informed party. They diﬀer on whether the politician is
held accountable for the choice or not. Under independent agency voters elect
a government once and for all in the ﬁrst period and cannot subsequently
vote it out, so the government is not accountable.
Under representative democracy, the governing party is accountable: It
will be voted out if the electorate is not satisﬁed. Voters are prospective,
they vote for the party they believe chooses a better policy for them in the
following period. Hence they will vote out a right wing party if they be-
lieve that the state of the world favors left wing policies. This may occur as
the parties are assumed to be ideologically more “stubborn” than the voters
in the middle: The median voter is a swing voter. As an example, con-
3sider the case where the uncertainty concerns the cost of the welfare state.
If the government sector is actually very eﬃcient and tax distortions are
low, the median voter prefers a large welfare state and votes for the leftist
party, while she votes right otherwise. This is an advantage of representative
democracy. However, this voting behavior also induces a cost to representa-
tive democracy. The governing party is interested in reelection. Since it has
information, the voters have not, its policy is a signal about the state of the
world. It may therefore distort its policy in order to manipulate the beliefs
of the electorate and become more popular. Some policy distortion always
occurs under representative democracy and it will be towards more extreme
policies. A right wing party chooses an even more rightist policy, in order to
signal that the state of the world favors right wing policies. We show that
high uncertainty about the state of the world tends to make representative
democracy a better governance structure than independent agency, since the
option value associated with the possibility of choosing another government
becomes high. In contrast, high expected polarization of the parties tends
to make independent agency better than representative democracy. The rea-
son is that the policy distortion associated with representatives democracy
becomes very large when polarization is high.
Clearly, voters receive information from many sources: newspapers, lob-
byists, business, organized labor etc. These many and varied sources of
information alleviates the asymmetric information problem. Still empirical
assessments show that a large fraction of the electorate typically is poorly
informed: As Bartels (1996) puts it “The political ignorance of the Amer-
ican voter is one of the best-documented features of contemporary politics
...”. It is also true that much of the information in media is cheap talk, that
”experts” often contradict each other and that the diﬀerent interest groups
4provide conﬂicting information.
The relative virtues of the diﬀerent modes of governance have been con-
sidered before in the literature. Maskin and Tirole (2001) consider a model,
where the salient issue is binary. The electorate’s preferred policy depends
on the state of the world, which is only known by politicians. Politicians do
not belong to parties and may or may not have congruent preferences with
the electorate at large. If the electorate decides to replace a politician in
an election, the preferences of the new politician are chosen at random. So
unlike in our framework, the policy space is binary and politicians do not
represent parties with known preferences, polarized on a left-right wing di-
mension. Maskin and Tirole show that the better the electorate is informed
about the state of the world, the more attractive is direct democracy. The
choice between representative democracy, where the chosen politician can
be replaced, and independent agencies (”juridical power” in the language of
Maskin and Tirole) depends on how eager the politician is to be reelected.
Unlike our analysis this is not derived from more basic assumptions about
t h ed e g r e eo fp o l a r i z a t i o n .
Alesina and Tabellini (2003) build on Holmstrom’s (1999) carreer concern
model. Bureaucrats seek to get good reputations for competency in order
to increase future pay and career opportunities, politicians do it in order
enhance voters’ perception of his talent so that he be reelected. The diﬀerent
motivations give rise to diﬀerent eﬀort levels. Alesina and Tabellini then
show (among other things) that politicians tend to be best for tasks which
are non-technical. They also show that time-consistency problems tends to
make bureaucrats more attractive. The driving force behind the results, the
career concerns is diﬀerent from the one explored in the present paper.
Hanssen (2002) studies the strategic choice of mode of governance by an
5incumbent government. An incumbent government may wish to delegate
decision authority to an independent agency in order to raise the cost of
changing a particular policy for a future government. Hansen shows that an
incumbent government is more likely to establish an independent judicary if
there is higher probability that it looses the next election and the polariza-
tion of politics is larger. In this way the current government ensures that
policy also in the future is guided by preferences close to its own. These re-
sults are related to the results of Persson and Svensson (1989) and Tabellini
and Alesina (1990) on the strategic choice of debt by incumbent governments
facing possible defeat in coming elections. Hansson shows that his prediction
is conﬁrmed on data from American states. Hanssen’s aim is diﬀerent from
ours. He considers strategic choice of institutions by an incumbent govern-
ment and not optimal choice of constitutions by the electorate. He does not
consider direct democracy.
Following the lead of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) a large literature
considers rent seeking politicians and the disciplining eﬀect of elections in
representative democracy, see and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a recent
overview. In this vein Aghinon et al (2002) investigate a model where an
elected politician has superior information and can promote and implement
reforms. The politican may be good and promote reform but may also be
bad and seek to grab rents. Whatever he promotes has to pass a referendum,
so a (super) majority can block it. This gives a tradeoﬀ at the constitutional
stage, a smaller the blocking majority makes it the more diﬃcult for a bad
politician to grab rents, but also more diﬃcult to pass reforms. Aghinon et
al then study the optimal choice of the size of the supermajority.
The importance of information and polarization for the functioning of
representative democracy has been the subject of several papers. Schultz
6(1996) considers a model where parties are better informed about the state
of the world than the electorate and commit to policies before an upcoming
election. If parties’ preferences are suﬃciently polarized, the electorate will
not learn the true state of the world and the electoral competition will lead
to ineﬃcient equilibria, since the parties’ policies do not reﬂect the state
of the world. In Schultz (2002) the electorate is supposed to have inferior
information about the state of the world and the preferences of the parties.
When parties cannot commit to policies before an election this leads to policy
distortions as the incumbent party seeks to manipulate the beliefs of the
electorate. The distortion depends on the relative imporatance of the two
kinds of uncertainty: Uncertainty about preferences leads to a bias towards
more centrist policies, while uncertainty about the state of the world leads
to more extreme policies. Cuikerman and Tommasi (1998) consider a model
with two kinds of uncertainty where parties commit to policies before an
election. Under some circumstances this leads to situations where a left
party most credibly can implement a rightist policy. Harrington (1993) and
Letterie and Swank (1998) study a slightly diﬀerent issue. In their papers the
government is unsure about the state of the economy. The policies chosen
then act as signals for the governments beliefs.
Kessler (2000) studies the relative merits of representative and direct
democracy when voters and politicians initially are uniformed about the
state of the world. She studies a one-period citizen-candidate model a la
Besley-Coate (1997). There are no parties - and thus polarization of parties
is not an issue - but policians are ordinary citizens who decide to run. In
Kessler’s model citizens can exert costly eﬀort in order to become informed.
Since ordinary voters have zero chance of being pivotal, they do not invest
in information aquisition and the policy decision is uninformed under direct
7democracy. In contrast, the elected polician in representative democracy has
incentives to gather information (for suﬃciently low costs) and the policy
choice will be informed. In this sense the model endogenizes and explains
the asymmetric information Downs (1957) focussed on and I just assume
in the present paper. Kessler also assumes that there is uncertainty about
candidates’ preferences. This induces a cost of representative democracy for
the voters as the policy choice will be unpredictable. The optimal mode of
governance then depends on which kind of uncertainty is the larger. Con-
trary to me, Kessler does not focus on polarization of parties and the policy
distortion it leads to in representative democracies. Furthermore, she does
not consider the eﬀects of accountability per se, independent agencies are not
considered. The cost of representative democracy in her setting exclusively
stems from the uncertainty about the policians’ preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the basic model. Direct democracy is treated in section 3. Sections 4 and
5 discus independent agencies and representative democracy. The optimal
mode of governance is derived in section 6. Some extensions and conclusions
are provided in section 7.
2B a s i c s
Consider a society which after a constitutional stage 0 lasts two periods, 1
and 2. In periods 1 and 2 society has to choose a policy x, which can be
ordered on a left-right dimension, x ∈ R. There are two parties: a left party
L and a right party R.
We wish to compare the expected consequences of direct and represen-
tative democracy and independent agencies evaluated at the constitutional
8stage 0.
There are a continuum of possible states of the world, s, uniformly dis-
tributed on [−σ,σ], where σ>0. T h es t a t eo ft h ew o r l di st h es a m ei nt h e
two periods. Voters are not informed about the true state of the world, but
they know the distribution of s.
Voters all have quadratic utility functions on the policy chosen, x, and
have diﬀerent bliss points. Voter a0s bliss point is a+s, so a voter preferes a
higher policy, the higher is the state of the world, s. There are a continuum
of voters, at date 0, the median voter is voter 0 (with a =0 ). Voter a0s
utility from policy x in state s is
−(x − a − s)
2 .
As is clear from the utility function, the size of σ determines whether
uncertainty about the state is important of not. If σ is very small, uncertainty
is small, and it is not so important to tailor the policy correctly to the state.
T h eo p p o s i t eh o l d si fσ is large. If x1 is chosen in period 1 and x2 in period
2, the total utility for voter a f r o mt h et w op e r i o d si s
−(x1 − a − s)
2 − δ(x2 − a − s)
2 ,
where the discount factor, δ, fulﬁlls 0 <δ≤ 1.
While voter 0 is the median voter at date 0, the median voter’s identity
and therefore bliss point may changea tf u t u r ed a t e s .T h i sm a yb eb e c a u s e
preferences in the electorate change or because there is abstention in elections.
The median voter at date 1 has a bliss point (m1 + s). At time 0, m1 is
unknown to the electorate, it is uniformly distributed on [−µ,µ], where µ>0.
Similarly, the median voter at date two has bliss point (m2 + s),w h e r em2
is uniform on [−µ,µ]. The variable µ represents the degree of uncertainty
about the electorate’s future preferences.
9Each of the parties, L or R, is headed by a political leader, who chooses
the policy of the party. The political leader is partly interested in policy, and
partly in power. The per period utility of the leader of party R is
−(x − (r +( 1− φ)s))
2 + b,
where r +(1− φ)s is the bliss point of the leader in state s and b represents
the beneﬁt from holding oﬃce. Just like the voters the party is interested in
the sum of discounted utility from the two periods.
We assume that 0 <φ<1. This implies that the bliss point of the
median voter changes more as a function of the state than the bliss point
of the politicians. The parameter φ is a measure of the stubbornness of the
party. If φ =1 , the party is extremely stubborn, it is locked into its platform
and will not change it in response to changes in s. If on the other hand φ =0 ,
the party is as responsive as are voters. The assumption φ>0 reﬂects that
parties to some extent are ideologically locked into their position. This may
be because parties are formed of people feeling strongly for politics. It may
also reﬂect, that the platform of a party typically depends on what is decided
in conventions and programs and therefore moves more slowly. As will be
clear, the stubbornness of the parties is important for the results: it implies
that the median voter’s vote will depend on the state of the economy, she
will be a swing voter.
Party L has a similar utility function, only diﬀerence is that r is replaced
with l<r .For simplicity, we consider the symmetric case where
l = −r. (1)
Hence, r is a measure of the polarization of parties. The larger is r, the more
the bliss points of the two parties diﬀer.
10At the constitutional stage the future polarization of parties is unknown:
r is a stochastic variable uniformly distributed on [0,ρ], where ρ>0. Thus
ρ is a measure of the expected degree of polarization, the expectation of r
equals ρ/2. Although the degree of polarization is unknown at the constitu-
tional stage, we assume that voters learn the preferences of the parties before
possible elections in periods one and two. Clearly, one could also hold the
view that voters may have diﬃculties in learning the preferences of politi-
cians - in particular if the party has not held power for years. However we
will assume that understanding the economy - the state of the world - is the
most compliated and important issue and focus on this. For a treatment in
representative democracy of the case where voters are uncertain both about
the state of the world and the preferences of the parties, see Schultz (2002).
Contrary to the voters, the parties are informed about the state of the
world, s. As discussed in the Introduction, parties are informed from experts,
the governing party has direct access to the bureaucracy, the leaders of the
parties are full time politicians whose job it is to gather the relevant infor-
mation and take decisions. The electorate, on the other hand does not have
as strong incentives to gather information.
We distinguish between three possible types of governance. Direct Democ-
racy, DD, Independent Agency, IA, and Representative Democracy, RD.
Under Direct Democracy the electorate in each period determines the policy,
and we will assume that this implies that the median voter’s preferred policy
is chosen. Under Independent Agency, the voters elect a party in the start of
period 1. The party governs for both periods and chooses the policy in each
period. Under Representative Democracy a party is elected in the start of
period 1. It chooses the ﬁr s tp e r i o dp o l i c y ,w h i c hi so b s e r v e db yt h ev o t e r s .
A new election occurs in the start of period 2. The newly elected party then
11chooses policy for period 2.
I nt h es e q u e lw ew i l lﬁnd the expected utility from each mode of gov-
ernance evaluated at date 0 for an arbitrary voter a. In this way a ranking
on the diﬀerent modes of governance is derived for each voter. As will be
clear, the relevant trade oﬀs are the same for all voters, regardless of their
bliss point. It will therefore be the case that all voters rank the diﬀerent
modes the same way and it is thus meaningful to speak of an optimal mode
of governance.
3 Direct democracy
In direct democracy, DD, voters in each period choose the policy preferred
by the median voter without knowledge of the state of nature. The median








The optimal policy for m1 is therefore
x = m1.
Similarly, the median voter in period two will choose x = m2. From the point























12W es e et h a tt h em o r eu n c e r t a i n t ya b o ut the state of the world and future
median voters - given by the respective variances1 - the less attractive is
Direct Democracy.
4 Independent Agency
Under Independent Agency, IA, voters elect a party before date 1, who
governs for both periods. The leadership of the party needs not worry about
reelection and chooses its preferred policy, given knowledge of the state,
regardless of the views of the median voter. The median voter m elects party
L if m<0, which occurs with probability 1
2, and elects R otherwise. The
expected utility for voter a from IA is therefore
u































The trade-oﬀ associated with Independent Agency is clearly reﬂected in this
expression. The larger the expected degree of polarization is, the less at-
tractive is IA. The advantage associated with IA is that the governing party
k n o w st h es t a t eo ft h ew o r l da n dt h ec h o s e np o l i c yt h e r e f o r er e ﬂects the state
of the world. The less stubborn the party is, i.e. the smaller φ is, the more
will the policy reﬂect the state and the higher is the expected utility of the
median voter.
1Recall that when s is uniform on [−σ,σ], then the variance equals σ2
3 .
135 Representative Democracy
Under representative democracy, an election is held before period one. The
elected party chooses the ﬁrst period policy and a new election is held after
period one. The winner of the second election chooses the second period
policy. Voters can observe the ﬁrst period policy before the second election,
however the utility consequences of the policy chosen in period one accrue
after the election. Therefore voters are not able to infer the state of the world
from the experienced utility level.
An equilibrium under Representative Democracy is a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium of the game where voters elect a party in period 1. The winning
party observes the state of the world and then chooses the ﬁrst period policy.
Voters observe the policy and form posterior beliefs about the state of the
world using Bayes’ rule from the prior and the governing party’s strategy.
The ﬁrst period governing party maximizes its expected utility taking into
account the formation of beliefs, the voting behavior at the second election
and the policy the other party will choose if the governing party looses the
election.
Whether voters can infer the true state of the world or not depends on
the governing party’s policy strategy. As is usual in models with a contin-
uum of states, a separating equilibrium exists under some conditions -see
Mailaith (1987). In a separating equilibrium the policy chosen by the the
governing party is strictly monotone in the state of the world and the voters
are therefore able to infer the true state for all realizations of the state.
We will ﬁrst focus on a separating equilibrium. We derive the equilibrium
by solving the model backwards and ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h es e c o n dp e r i o d . T h e
second period is the last, so the parties have no reelection concerns. If elected
14in the second term party R will choose
x = r +( 1− φ)s,
and L will choose
x = −r +( 1− φ)s.
Hence, in a separating equilibrium, where the median voter, m2, learns the
state s, she prefers party R if
−(r +( 1− φ)s − m2 − s)




As m2 is uniformly distributed on [−µ,µ], it follows that the probability that













2µ if −1 <
sφ
µ < 1









then Pr(R,s) is always given by the second line. We ﬁrst focus on this case.
Equation (4) makes clear that a party cannot increase the probability that
it wins the election with a discrete jump by moving the policy a bit closer
to the middle. The reason is that the position of the median voter is not
k n o w nw i t hc e r t a i n t yb e f o r et h ee l e c t i o n .T h ep a y o ﬀ functions of the parties
are therefore diﬀerentiable and easily tractable.
15Let se (x) be the state voters believe prevails, when they observe policy
x. In a separating equilibrium, where party R chooses policy x(s) in the ﬁrst
period in state s, it will be the case that
s
e (x(s)) = s.
Assuming that x(s) is diﬀerentiable and strictly monotone, which we will








Assume that party R is the governing party in period one. In a separating
equilibrium, party R0s total expected utility from choosing policy x in period




−(x − (r +( 1− φ)s))
2+Pr(R,s
e (x))δ(0 + b)−(1 − Pr(R,s
e (x)))δ(2r)
2 .
This is comprised of the ﬁrst period utility from policy x plus the expected
second period utility. With probability Pr(R,se (x)) party R wins the second
election if it chooses x today. In this case it chooses its bliss point in the
second period and gets utility 0 plus the beneﬁts from oﬃce b. With the
complementary probability party L wins the second election and chooses its
bliss point giving party R utility −(2r)
2 .
As we assume (5), and rational voters will have expectations se ∈ [−σ,σ], Pr(R,se) ∈

























16Assuming that the second order condition is fulﬁlled, which we will verify
below, party R0s optimal choice of policy in period 1 is therefore given by












































This is a ﬁrst order diﬀerential equation with solution












W es e et h a tp a r t yR distorts its policy upwards above its bliss point r+
(1 − φ)s and that the distortion is larger, the larger is the degree of po-
larization, the pure power beneﬁt, b, the density of the distribution of the
median voter (which equals 1
2µ), and the degree of stubbornness. More po-
larization and stubbornness, makes party L0s policy worse from the point of
view of party R. It therefore becomes more eager to win the election, and
since a higher x improves R0s chance of winning it distorts its policy further








higher is se (x) the larger is the probability of winning. In the separating
equilibrium, se (x)=x−1 (x(s)).U s i n g(8) this gives
s
e (x)=











17which is strictly increasing in x. Ah i g h e rx therefore improves party R0s
chance of winning the election. In equilibrium, the party trades oﬀ the ﬁrst
period loss from having a too high policy with the second period gain from
winning the election with a higher probability. A high density of the median
voter distribution implies that many votes are gained from changing se a
little. A high 1
µ therefore makes the policy more distorted. Similarly, a high
δ makes tomorrow more important and the incentive to distort the policy
today is increased.
In equilibrium, voters are not fooled by party R0s attempt to manipulate
their beliefs, they perfectly learn the state. The party nevertheless has to
distort its policy upwards, since had it not, the voters would have expected
the state was lower and party R h a dw o nt h es e c o n de l e c t i o nw i t hal o w e r
probability.
Incidentally, equation (9) shows that se (·) is a diﬀerentiable function as
claimed. Since it is linear in x, it is readily seen that the second order
condition for maximum of UR (x,s,se (x)) is fulﬁlled as claimed above.
If party L wins the ﬁrst election, everything is as above except that party
L chooses policy












Party L distorts the policy downwards.


































































































































The ﬁrst term in (10) equals uIA , this is the expected utility of voter a,
when the same party chooses its bliss point in both periods. The second
term reﬂects the loss to voter a, due to the policy distortion in the ﬁrst
period. The third term reﬂects the gains from accountability. This is the
expected value of having the opportunity to choose the other party, should
the state of the world make this party most favorable to voter a.
19The term c(b) stems from the extra distortion the governing party makes
b e c a u s ei tw o u l dl i k et oe n j o yt h eb e n e ﬁts from power, b, i nt h en e x tp e r i o d .
We see that the higher the beneﬁts from oﬃce, the lower is the expected
utility for the voters from representative democracy. Notice that c(0) = 0.
The loss from the ﬁrst period distortion is clearly larger, the larger the
distortion and therefore larger the larger is ρ, φ, 1
µ and δ as discussed in
relation to the policy. The gain from accountability increases in the same
variables as well as the uncertainty about the state as reﬂected in σ. When
σ is high, the gain from exchanging government in the second period is po-
tentially high. This is even more important the more stubborn the parties
are and the larger is polarization. More uncertainty about the future median
voter’s blisspoint - a higher µ - makes accountability less valueable, since it
introduces uncertainty about the electoral outcome in the second election.
5.1 A semi-separating equilibrium
When condition (5) is not fulﬁlled the above analysis modiﬁes when s is low




φ], the probability that party R wins is still given by
the second line in (4) and the analysis is unchanged. For s ∈ [−σ,−
µ
φ] party
R looses the election for sure in a potential separating equilibrium. In this
case party R has no incentive to distort its policy, and it chooses its bliss
point. This implies that voters still learn the state for s ∈ [−σ,−
µ
φ] and the
equilibrium will be separating in this range. For s ∈ [
µ
φ,σ] party R wins for
sure if voters learn that indeed s belongs to this range. If voters believe this,
party R cannot increase the probability that it wins by choosing a higher x.
Hence, the incentive to distort x further disappears. To reduce the length of
the formulas, we let b =0in the following. If party R is the governing party
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r +( 1− φ)s for −σ ≤ s ≤−
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µr2 ≤ s ≤ σ if the interval exists
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Given these beliefs and the results of the previous section it is easy to check
that the strategy is indeed optimal for party R.






µr2, is determined by the condition that





















(r +( 1− φ)s − a − s)































































2 − a − s
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(r +( 1− φ)s − a − s)
2 + δ(r +( 1− φ)s − a − s)
2 ds
which does not simplify nicely. However, the eﬀect should be clear. Com-
pared with the fully separating equilibrium of the previous section, the dis-
tortion is smaller. For low values of s, s ∈ [−σ,−
µ
φ], there is no distortion in
the ﬁrst period and a certain change of government in the next period, for
high values of s, s ∈ [
µ
φ,σ], the distortion is smaller. This tends to make RD
more favorable than if there were distortions for all s.
In the following we concentrate on the case where (5) is fulﬁlled and the
equilibrium fully separating under RD.
6 The constitutional choice
We now consider the constitutional choice at date 0. Any voter prefers the
mode of governance which gives the highest expected utility. In the formulas
for the expected utilities for each mode of governance, a voter’s idiosyncratic
part of her bliss point, a, enters only once in the term −(1 + δ)a2. Hence
22the ranking in expected utility of the three modes of governance is the same
for all voters a. The reason is simple, the three modes of governance are not
biased in any particular way on the left-right dimension. Hence, the relevant
trade oﬀsb e t w e e nt h et h r e em o d e sa r et h es a m ef o ra l lv o t e r s .
We proceed by comparing the modes pairwise.






Direct democracy has the disadvantage that the state of the world is unknown
to the decision maker, the future median voter, and the position of this
median voter is also uncertain. The larger are the uncertainties about this,
the less attractive is DD. Independent Agency ensures that the choice of
policy is informed. This advantage is larger the less stubborn are the parties.
Furthermore polarization makes independent agency less attractive.























that is when the gain from accountability exceeds the utility cost of the



















Hence the larger the variance of the state, the more attractive is RD.
This makes accountability, the option of replacing the party in power, more
valuable. Diﬀerentiating the right hand side wrt ρ s h o w si ti si n c r e a s i n gi nρ.
When ρ increases, then the ﬁrst period policies become more distorted under
RD and this tends to make IA more attractive. A higher discount factor
23increases the option value from the possibility of replacing the government
in the future, but it also increases the governing party’s incentives to distort
the ﬁrst period policy. The latter eﬀect dominates, therefore a higher δ tends
to make RD less attractive. The same is true for the density of the median
voter 1
2µ. The increase in the distortion of policy dominates the eﬀect that
the government is more often replaced. The degree of stubbornness enters
non-monotonically on the right hand side.















Proof: Multiplying on both sides with 1 − φ




















which clearly true as 0 <φ<1, and ρ,µ,δ > 0¤
Combining the pairwise comparisons above and using Lemma 1, directly
gives
Theorem 2 Assume that condition (5) holds. All voters ﬁnd at date 0 that
1. DD is the preferred mode of governance if the uncertainty about the






2. IA is the preferred mode of governance if the uncertainty about the state




















243. RD is the preferred mode of governance if the uncertainty about the


















A higher degree of expected polarization of parties, ρ, increase all the
above cut-oﬀ points.
Direct Democracy is best when the uncertainty about the state is low.
The informational advantage from delegating the policy decision to an in-
formed politician becomes small in this case. A higher degree of polarization
of parties also makes direct democracy more attractive. The cut-oﬀ point be-
tween IAand RD is also increased when the degree of polarization increases.
The increased polarization makes RD less attractive, since the policy distor-
tions in the ﬁrst period increase. An increase in the degree of stubbornness,
makes direct democracy more attractive. The eﬀect on the boundary between
IA and RD depends on the exact parameter values as it tends to make both
modes less attractive. Finally an increase in the density of the future me-
dian voters makes DD more attractive- this reduces the uncertainty about
the future policies chosen under DD. An increase in 1
µ also makes RD less
attractive relative to IA.
Figure 2 below illustrates the Theorem for φ = 1
4,δ= .9,b=0and
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7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper has studied the trade oﬀ implied by the polarization of politics
and the asymmetric information between the politicians and the electorate.
The main message of this paper is that the degree of polarization of politics
and the uncertainty about the state of nature are important determinants
for which mode of governance is optimal. The more polarized is politics and
the less is the uncertainty about the state of the world, the more attractive
is direct democracy. The less polarization and more uncertainty about the
state of the world, the more attractive representative democracy. For in-
termediate values independent agencies may be the optimal choice of mode
of governance. For high degrees of polarization, the incumbent government
distorts policy and this induces a cost which overshadows the beneﬁtf r o m
26representative democracy, the option value attached to the fact that the vot-
ers may replace the government. An important extension of the model will
be to include the role of an independent press. Ceteris paribus, one will ex-
pect that this will make representative democracy more attractive from the
point of the voters, since the governments inﬂuence on voters’ beliefs will be
reduced, this should reduce the tendency to distort the policy.
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